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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the public discourse about a group of Japanese men called 
sōshokudanshi, or herbivore boys. Herbivore boys are commonly depicted as young men in their 
twenties and thirties who are heterosexual, yet uninterested in such heterosexually normative 
activities as dating and sex. They are often described by journalists as androgynous and passive, 
more concerned with consumption than the production-oriented masculinities of Japan’s older 
generation. At stake in discourse is precisely this tension between Japan’s older and newer 
masculinities, between conservative gender ideology and the new challenges young men present 
to gender roles and heterosexuality.  
After their introduction into public discourse, sōshokudanshi sparked national attention, 
propelled by feelings of outrage and indignation at these young, allegedly irresponsible men who 
neither show interest in marriage nor in holding down full-time jobs, the hallmark of corporate 
masculinity under 1980s Japan. In refusing to adhere to the strictly delineated lifestages that 
Japanese society expects its members to follow, herbivore boys problematize naturalized 
assumptions about gender. At the same time, they draw attention to the failure of hegemonic 
masculinity, the dominant form of manhood which increasing appears outdated in light of 
women’s growing autonomy and the recent emphasis on lifestyle-based identities.  
 Yet despite widespread media attention, few if any young men would call themselves 
herbivore boys. Rather, sōshokudanshi is a label created in and through discourse by older 
members of Japanese society. By analyzing public discourses in the mass media, this thesis 
argues that older Japanese men construct herbivore boys as a scapegoat on which to cast blame 
for Japan’s low birthrate and stagnating economy, while simultaneously excluding young men 
from participating in the discussion. It further suggests that the conversation about 
sōshokudanshi is a site where knowledge is commodified per the general trend in advanced 
capitalist economies. 
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Introduction 
In 2011, an article titled “No Sex, Please, We’re Young Japanese Men” appeared on the 
website of the Wall Street Journal: Japan, a magazine that targets a cosmopolitan English and 
Japanese-speaking audience. The article describes the disinterest in “real-life sex” among a 
growing segment of Japan’s population, a group of young men called sōshokudanshi, or 
“herbivore boys” (Tomikawa 2011).1 This group’s sexual behavior appears to be at the center of 
Japan’s latest troubles, including an economy in recession and a low birth rate of 1.25, well 
under the number of 2.08 that Japan needs to sustain its population (Kitazume 2006). Herbivore 
boys refrain from dating, marriage, and full-time employment in the economy, and for this 
reason CEOs, writers, and a variety of experts describe herbivore boys as a social malaise, 
juxtaposing them with carnivores, or men who pursue women, sex, and financial and 
occupational success (Yamaoka 2011).  
As subjects implicated in numerous controversial issues underpinning the socioeconomic 
and gender status quo, herbivore boys offer insights into the sustainability of a value system that 
privileges older heterosexual men over all other groups in Japanese society. Although discourse 
about herbivore boys is often hostile to young men, the entire discussion reflects the interests of 
numerous speakers with different reasons and goals for considering the subject of sōshokudanshi. 
My goal in this thesis is to evaluate and critique this ongoing conversation about 
herbivore boys, or what I call sōshokudanshi discourse. As such, I am not interested probing an 
actual population of herbivore boys. Instead, this thesis will make two primary arguments, both 
of which revolve around the construction of young men as herbivore boys without their consent 
or input. First, this thesis will suggest that interlocutors—journalists, writers, bloggers, and self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this thesis, I italicize sōshokudanshi when referring to the word itself. I keep sōshokudanshi in normal font when 
referencing individuals, the group, or the phenomenon. 
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described “experts”—construct herbivore boys as a discursive scapegoat on which to cast blame 
for Japan’s low birthrate and stagnating economy.2 Second, it will contend that sōshokudanshi 
discourse represents a site where knowledge is commodified per the general trend in advanced 
capitalist economies 
These criticisms leveled at herbivore boys are by no means new. Japan’s older generation 
regularly accuses other groups of young men and women of similar transgressions. Yet even 
within this broad category of “youth,” herbivore boys occupy a special niche deserving of closer 
scrutiny. Largely due to its social stigma, young men do not identify as sōshokudanshi. 
Nonetheless, women and older men in particular use herbivore boys as a discursive tool to 
address their anxieties and insecurities, as well as to maintain heterosexual gender boundaries. 
An examination of herbivore boys in the Japanese media reveals the gendered nature of 
knowledge production, yet leaves the possibility of a shift to a more open construction of 
masculinity.  
Here, my understanding of “masculinity” is heavily informed by scholarship of R. W. 
Connell. For Connell, masculinity is not only a location within the nexus of gender relations, but 
also the associated practices and effects that men and women (re)produce as they interact with 
this location (Connell 2005: 71). Masculinity is thus not simply a set of ideas about manhood. 
Rather, masculinit(ies) are multiple and shifting positions inscribed within actions and upon the 
human body. 
Definition of Sōshokudanshi  
On a basic level, popular public discourse represents sōshokudanshi as 1) young men in 
their 20s and 30s who are 2) heterosexual, but largely uninterested in such heteronormative 
activities as dating, sex, and marriage (Big Reporter Namiki 2009; www.so-shoku.net 2013) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  I	  use	  the	  word	  “interlocutor”	  in	  reference	  to	  participants’	  roles	  in	  discourse.	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3) are adverse to competition of any sort (Asahi Shimbun 2010; Okuda 2009: 3-4). Most 
Japanese journalists, bloggers, writers, and other self-described experts on herbivore boys appear 
to agree on these criteria, though they often disagree about other characteristics. Some of the 
more debatable qualities frequently ascribed to herbivore boys are a kind or gentle spirit 
(Morioka 2011: 18), a straightforward or serious attitude (Fukasawa 2009a), and a passive 
disposition (Non-No 2008: 106). Other accounts depict sōshokudanshi as part-time workers 
(www.so-shoku.net 2013) who maintain platonic romances or friends-only relationships with 
women. Some even specify that herbivore boys are fashion conscious (Fukasawa 2009a; Suzuki 
2012), enjoy cooking and handicrafts (Asahi Shimbun 2009; Big Reporter Namiki 2009), refrain 
from smoking or drinking (Fukasawa 2009b; Yomiuri Shimbun 2009), are good listeners 
(www.so-shoku.net 2013), and like to visit sweets shops (Nishida 2010; Takeda 2009).3  
Language and Knowledge Production 
My analysis of Japanese media draws upon a body of scholarly literature that scrutinizes 
language’s role in knowledge production. People often assume that language serves a purely 
descriptive function, characterizing preexisting and “natural” facts or features that exist 
independently in the world. Yet philosophers, anthropologists, and feminists point out that 
language generates knowledge by giving it meaning and relevance. 
Michel Foucault illustrates principle in “A History of Sexuality Volume 1: An 
Introduction.” He argues that discourse constructs sex, whether as a shameful and forbidden 
pleasure or as a fundamental truth of Western science. Neither the processes nor the products of 
discourse are innocent, but laden with power from innumerable and shifting nodes on a web that 
is variously inhabited by people, apparatuses, and institutions (Foucault 1990: 96). Power and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In Japan, smoking and drinking are masculine activities. Sweets shops serve cake, candy, and a variety of pastries. 
Frequenting sweets shops is gendered a feminine activity.  
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discourse are inextricably linked in that “power’s hold on sex is maintained through language, or 
rather through the act of discourse that creates, from the very fact that it is articulated, a rule of 
law” (Foucault 1990: 83). Yet power and discourse are fluid and unpredictable, double-edged 
strategies that may impede the very people who develop them (Foucault 1990: 101). 
Indeed, language generates the very partial realities from which people claim to extract 
knowledge, as well as the people who engage in acts of knowing: “It is the discourse that makes 
the person who invokes it look like its agent” (Inoue 2006: 22, emphasis author's). If language is 
always a part of culture, defining what counts as knowledge and what is worth knowing, then 
such social constructs as gender and race are created in and through language. They are multiple, 
fragmented, and lack an objective existence apart from their limited manifestations within 
discourse. Likewise, discourse does not describe herbivore boys, it produces them as knowable 
subjects.  
Within sōshokudanshi discourse, the primary producers of knowledge are rendered 
invisible by what Feminist Donna Haraway calls the “god trick,” the illusion that knowledge 
originates in monolithic Reality (1988). The speaking subject (i.e. older Japanese men) merely 
relays this unmediated, unadulterated information to the public. In actuality, such knowledge is 
highly ideological, generated by patriarchy’s gaze. This gaze allows privileged speakers to claim 
access to all-encompassing knowledge while masking their role in the process of knowledge 
production (Haraway 1988: 581). 
A look at surveys about herbivore boys demonstrates how Haraway’s god trick is 
particularly relevant, reinforces the centrality of language to knowledge production, and suggests 
that sōshokudanshi do not exist as a population apart from discourse. 
Survey Says: Do Sōshokudanshi Exist? 
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In this section, I critique the surveys that interlocutors cite as proof of an herbivorous 
population. I show that the available evidence is both circumstantial and the product of badly 
conducted research. While many of these surveys attempt to produce the kind of locationless, 
sweeping knowledge that Haraway effectively discredits, the surveys largely fail even by the 
standards of scientific objectivity. Instead, their flawed execution supports Foucault’s argument 
that knowledge is constructed through discourse. By basing their claims about herbivore boys on 
these surveys, and by instantiating these claims as knowledge, interlocutors build their body of 
knowledge on a shaky foundation.  
The assertion that “herbivore boys are on the rise” thus reveals the “god trick” as a ruse, 
an act that only works because the audience wants to believe in its magic. For this reason, few 
object to the way herbivore boys are discursively constructed according to and through male-
centered heteronormative dictates. As I will argue later, many Japanese unquestioningly accept 
the existence of herbivore boys because along with other youth, sōshokudanshi provide a 
convenient scapegoat for many of Japan’s socioeconomic ills. 
One commonly referenced survey, conducted in 2009 by the think tank M1・F1, asked a 
series of questions to a group of 20-34 year-old men drawn from three prefectures in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan area. The survey then classified these young men as sōshokudanshi based on their 
responses. Two problems immediately surface concerning this survey’s methodology. First, the 
survey provides no justification for why its particular configuration of traits constitutes 
sōshokudanshi. Defining sōshokudanshi is important, especially considering the numerous and 
widely differing opinions about herbivore boys. Yet the survey employs an arbitrarily assembled 
group of characteristics, including one I have never seen echoed elsewhere: “Sōshokudanshi will 
often keep in touch with the media.” Assuming that to “keep in touch” refers to paying attention, 
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any number of other groupings of young men—or young women for that matter—could fit this 
description, especially given the pervasiveness of the media in Japan. 
Second, the survey imposes the label sōshokudanshi, irrespective of what respondents 
think. Because people are categorized rather than asked to identify, the survey found a high 
prevalence of sōshokudanshi within Japanese society: 60 percent of respondents aged 20-22 are 
herbivorous (M1・F1 Research 2009). This figure is questionable at best, both because several 
informants suggested that such an identity is an affront to a man’s “pride,” and also given the 
difficulty of finding self-identified sōshokudanshi in Japan.4  
Other surveys show a similar lack of sophistication. A Yahoo! survey asks respondents a 
simple yes or no question: Do they know any sōshokudanshi? The high number of “yes” 
responses (60 percent of n = 26233) may reflect a situation I encountered in Japan: The people 
who were introduced to me as sōshokudanshi did not see themselves in this way (Yahoo! Japan 
2009). Like the first survey, the Yahoo! survey does not define “sōshokudanshi,” leaving its 
definition up to respondents who doubtless hold differing ideas about herbivore boys. Yahoo! 
further asks respondents to place the label sōshokudanshi on unsuspecting others. This practice is 
consistent with the way older Japanese men and women contain and manage the behavior of 
young people by categorizing them into easily identifiable boxes. 
While the Yahoo! survey does not include any information on the people who 
participated, a third survey on “marriage hunting,” provides a little more background by breaking 
respondents down according to gender.5 This survey, conducted by the insurance company 
Lifenet, asks men and women to specify whether they would prefer an herbivorous or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 According to Karen Nakamura, a Professor of Anthropology at Yale University, one of her students initially set out 
to study sōshokudanshi, but was forced to change or revise her topic because like me, she couldn’t find any 
sōshokudanshi. 
5 Konkatsu, or marriage hunting, refers to a regimen where women and sometimes men pay to engage in structured 
interaction with prospective marriage partners. 
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carnivorous spouse. Over 60 percent of the women who responded prefer “herbivorous” men 
over “carnivorous” men (Lifenet 2009).  
Another survey, conducted in 2009 by the dating agency Partner Agent, is slightly more 
detailed in its questions, but still does not contribute much to defining or describing an actual 
population of sōshokudanshi. The survey also asks about nikushokujoshi or carnivore girls, 
herbivore boys’ counterpart (discussed further in Chapter Three). The survey’s questions 
include: “Do you know the words sōshokudanshi and nikushokujoshi?” “Are there 
sōshokudanshi or nikushokujoshi around you?” “What do you think about sōshokudanshi or 
nikushokujoshi?” and finally “What are your reasons for going out with/marrying a 
sōshokudanshi or nikushokujoshi?” (Partner Agent 2009). Clearly, these surveys fail to measure 
the existence of sōshokudanshi as a group, self-identified or otherwise. Combined with the 
conspicuous absence of sōshokudanshi voices in sōshokudanshi discourse (also discussed in 
Chapter Three), this supports the conclusion that herbivore boys are a signifier without a 
signified, a subject created within the realm of discourse. 
Interlocutors in sōshokudanshi discourse sometimes cite other circumstantial evidence to 
support their claims about herbivore boys’ existence. Some maintain that sōshokudanshi are 
increasing in number, pointing to statistics from the National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research that show 60 percent of single Japanese men are not in relationships with 
members of the opposite sex (2011: 10).6 Yet any number of other explanations could account 
for this number. For example, rather than being herbivore boys, youth who occupy marginal 
positions in the Japanese economy may be unable to afford the high emotional, fiscal, and time 
investments involved in romantic relationships.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research defines “relationship” as heterosexual. It 
apparently does not consider same-sex relationships to be a viable variable. 
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Again, none of this proof directly demonstrates the presence of herbivore boys within 
Japanese society. While interlocutors use these surveys as a scientific account of the One True 
Reality, such information does not count as knowledge, at least according to the criteria set out 
by patriarchy’s impartial, locationless gaze. Secondhand accounts, missing demographic 
information from respondents, and arbitrary groupings of sōshokudanshi characteristics sans 
explanation—all are necessary parts of scientifically objective knowledge, and all are 
conspicuously absent. When surveys are used in this capacity, they demonstrate the constructed 
nature of knowledge: non-existent groups are projected into social reality through a scientific 
discourse that ignores its own rules and methodological standards.  
Admittedly, some of herbivore boys’ alleged behaviors match behavioral trends among 
young men. Namely, a growing number of young men no longer aspire to full-time employment 
(Honda 2006: 155), while others use beautification technologies (Miller 2006: 127), and remain 
single (NIPSSR 2012).7 Nevertheless, when older men and women subsume these characteristics 
under the label “sōshokudanshi,” they artificially group, define, and contain young men within 
an identity that young men themselves reject. Herbivorous behaviors may exist, but herbivore 
boys themselves have no basis in social reality. 
Why do older men and women claim that sōshokudanshi are a growing population within 
Japan (MyNavi 2013; Yamaoka 2011; Yomiuri Shimbun 2011)? There are two reasons for this, 
each tied to one of the primary questions I address in this thesis. For now, I will briefly articulate 
my arguments, saving the evidence for Chapters Two and Three. 
First, interlocutors capitalize on the topic of sōshokudanshi in order to net publicity and 
make money. By claiming that herbivore boys are on the rise, interlocutors increase the value of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Not only is there a growing trend toward later marriages for both men and women, Japan is currently witnessing a 
sharp increase in the number of men and women who have never married (NIPSSR 2012).  
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sōshokudanshi as a knowledge-commodity, generating interest—in both senses of the word—for 
and from the public attention paid to this nonexistent group. Second, a widespread phenomenon 
is easy to blame, and herbivore boys serve precisely this function when interlocutors construct 
them as scapegoats and discursive decoys or distractions.  
René Girard provides a useful account of the process of scapegoating. He argues that 
scapegoats offer a convenient means of excising culpability from within a group. When a 
cultural or social order faces a perceived threat, its members may single out an individual or 
subgroup, designating this minority as the source of whatever problem seemingly plagues the 
group as a whole (Girard 1986: 15). Now a scapegoat, the individual or subgroup takes on the 
group’s sins, and in this process, the rest of the group is rendered blameless (Girard 1986: 43). 
As I will shortly argue, sōshokudanshi adhere to this definition of “scapegoat” when they 
draw attention away from older men, many of who rigidly adhere to an outdated model of 
masculinity that has rendered them incapable of rectifying or responding to Japan’s stagnating 
economy. Within public discourse, herbivore boys assume their fathers’ sins, absolving older 
men of responsibility for the conflicts and crises that have rocked Japan since the early 1990s. 
The young men so labeled are metaphorically cast out, and their alleged irresponsibility serves as 
further justification for denying them access to positions of social privilege and maintaining their 
marginalized status relative to salarymen.  
Methodology 
My scholarly interest in herbivore boys and my choice of sōshokudanshi as a research topic 
springs from the particular affinity I feel with the young men so labeled. As someone who felt 
heterosexual desire but never really acted upon it—nor had much interest in doing so—I 
empathize with the way young Japanese men are pressured to date, have sex, and marry, despite 
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their profound disinterest in doing so. This sympathy colors my approach to the topic of 
herbivore boys, and I found myself approaching sōshokudanshi from the standpoint of the young 
men. From the outset, I was critical of the opinion expressed by older men and women, and 
while I have tried to mitigate the way my initial bias affects my treatment of the topic, this thesis 
remains the product of an anthropologist who feels more in common with these young Japanese 
men and their sexuality than with their critics. 
While I initially set out to meet and communicate with sōshokudanshi, hoping perhaps to 
compare experiences, for the reasons already elaborated, I was forced to change my 
methodology from ethnography to a discourse analysis of Japanese media.8 To this end, I draw 
upon a diverse body of popular and semi-scholarly texts—including self-help books, novels, 
Japanese comics, women’s magazines, and newspaper articles, online news articles, blogs, 
websites.  
I acquired my sources in a number of ways. I located and purchased most of the books, 
novels, comics, and women’s magazines by searching the websites of such Japanese retailers as 
Amazon.co.jp. I found the newspaper articles through the University of Kansas’ library, which 
holds a subscription to two databases containing scanned copies of the Yomiuri Shimbun and the 
Asahi Shimbun, both prominent national newspapers. I turned up many of the online news 
articles, blogs, and websites by searching for such terms as sōshokudanshi, sōshokukeidanshi, 
ojōman, and their variants in such online search engines as Google.co.jp and Yahoo.co.jp. Others 
I discovered by cross-referencing the above sources to find new ones, and still others I found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Thanks	  to	  my	  committee	  member,	  Dr.	  Carlos	  Nash,	  for	  meeting	  with	  me	  over	  the	  course	  of	  two	  semesters	  
and	  helping	  to	  refine	  my	  understanding	  of	  discourse	  analysis.	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with the help of the librarians at the University of Kansas.9 Over the course of two years, I 
regularly repeated and refined these searches to look for newly published items. 
I supplement this approach with fieldwork conducted in Japan during the summer of 2012 
while attending courses funded by a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowship at 
the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies (IUC) in Yokohama. The IUC 
program is flexible, adapting itself to the specific needs of each graduate student. I was thus able 
to use class time and activities to explore Japanese perceptions of sōshokudanshi. My informants 
for this study consisted primarily of professors and college students who are affiliated with the 
IUC.  
Additionally, my research data include two semi-structured interviews. My first interviewee 
was Professor Masahiro Morioka of Osaka Prefecture University, who later directed me to the 
second interviewee, to whom I will refer using the pseudonym Imamura.10 Upon meeting this 
second individual, I discovered that contrary to Morioka’s intimations, Imamura does not self-
identify as an herbivore boy. My encounter with Imamura was the clearest example of a setback 
that I faced during my fieldwork: I quickly found that Imamura and other young men are 
unwilling to claim the sōshokudanshi identity, in part due to the unstated social stigma attached 
to herbivore boys—one also attached to other young men who perform gender through practices 
of consumption.  
Creative Work and Lifestyle-Based Masculinities 
In her discussion of the marketing strategies used in a genre of Japanese television called 
“trendy dramas,” Gabriella Lukács writes that lifestyle “suggests to consumers that they can 
freely choose social selves for themselves while excluding as a basis for identity the position 
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they hold within the systems of production” (2010: 8). Lifestyle is a term that aptly suits a 
generation that defines itself through consumption, but feels no particular loyalty to class. 
Undoubtedly, lifestyle has become the guiding marker of identity among young men, and not just 
sōshokudanshi. Herbivore boys are but one example of an alternative masculinity among youth 
who increasingly value creative work and flexible lifestyles. Other highly visible young men 
who participate in creative work include the Japanese boy band SMAP, formed in the late 1980s 
and named for the initials of its members’ names, and a more recent group of young men known 
as hosts. At host clubs, women pay young men—hosts—for their attention, conversation, and the 
fantasy of romance. Hosts compete with one another to draw in the most customers, employing 
beautification technologies and fashion in order to seduce female clients (Takeyama 2005: 201; 
2010: 236). Both hosts and SMAP rely on the appeal of their commodified images, intangible 
goods that have begun to supersede tangible goods as the driving force of advanced capitalist 
economies (Lukács 2010: 27).  
In order to convince women to spend money on them, hosts cultivate an effeminate, 
refined persona through a complex of practices gestures and bodily deportments (Takeyama 
2010: 237-238). Similarly, SMAP initially gained its popularity not through singing, but via a 
comedy television show that emphasized the handsome features and developed the unique 
personalities of each of its members. Since then, SMAP’s albums and songs have received 
numerous awards and national recognition, despite widespread agreement, even among fans, that 
one of SMAP’s four members is incapable of carrying a tune. Because music is only part of what 
SMAP represents, to buy a SMAP album is to buy into the SMAP image and lifestyle. 
For hosts, SMAP, and herbivore boys, the key metaphor is choice, the ability to select a 
social identity based on consumption patterns. As such, herbivore boys are far from the radical 
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outliers that some interlocutors make them out to be: They have clear continuity with other 
lifestyle-based masculinities and young men engaged in creative work. Like hosts and SMAP, 
the sōshokudanshi lifestyle is an assembly of consumption habits, including dress and demeanor, 
which prioritize the images that commodities project, rather than material objects per se. 
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Chapter One: Historical Context and Literature Review 
In this chapter, I provide some of the historical context in preparation for my discussion 
of sōshokudanshi discourse in Chapters Two and Three. I highlight how positions of social, 
political, and economic power continue to be monopolized by older men who came of age during 
or prior to Japan’s economic downturn. I further explain how young men and women who value 
creative work are deprivileged by societal and structural configurations that marginalize them 
and leave them vulnerable to the whims of market forces. This discussion of Japan’s political 
economy will inform Chapter Two, where I examine two key figures in sōshokudanshi discourse 
in order to uncover how knowledge is commodified. 
The Rise and Fall of Japan Inc. 
In the 1980s, Japan entered a period of growth that was astounding when one takes into 
account Japan’s devastation during World War II. Close collaboration among industry, the state, 
and the educational system earned Japan the moniker Japan Inc. (Yoda 2006b: 29), and 
collectively Japan Inc. produced what many today still call an “economic miracle.” Because of 
its recovery, Japan suddenly found itself thrust to the forefront of the First World, eventually 
overtaking the European nations to rank second in the global economy in the 1980s. After 
postwar attempts to modernize and catch up to the West, social commentators and politicians 
hailed this development as proof that Japan had defeated the West at the very game that the West 
itself had begun (Yoda 2006b: 34). 
Although Japan’s industry leaders, government officials, and the general public thought 
they had discovered a formula that made capitalism sustainable, this belief began to crumble 
after a depression shook Japan’s economy in the beginning of the 1990s. At first economists 
dismissed the recession as a brief phase that would soon vanish and be forgotten, but as the 21st 
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century approached, both experts and the public realized that the economic slump was not 
temporary. People searched for the reason behind Japan Inc.’s failure, and close scrutiny 
revealed that the entire project bore the seeds of disaster from the very start. 
What critics hailed previously as stable now appeared precarious. The Japanese made 
bank loans and business deals “on the basis of a whistle and a handshake,” while in practice 
companies rewarded not ingenuity, nor talent, nor even competence, but loyalty and submission 
to authority (Harootunian 2006: 104). Moreover, Japan had premised its entire rise to economic 
prominence on a system of exploitation that squeezed labor out of predominantly male workers, 
who in turn relied on the unpaid labor of women in the home (Allison 1996: xx).  
After the 1990s depression, even the male-dominated workplace lost much of its luster. 
Previously, industry and government had touted Japan’s lifetime employment system—whereby 
men in salaried positions were guaranteed jobs until retirement—as the only one of its kind in the 
world. Still, the reality of lifetime employment was quite different from the ideal. A relatively 
small proportion of the workforce benefited from lifetime employment, and a mandatory 
retirement age limited how long men held their positions in the workforce (Genda 2003: 132). 
Although economic pressures eventually forced companies to scrap any claims to a lifetime 
employment policy, this change surprisingly has not benefited most young women and men, 
sōshokudanshi included, many of who continue to look for stable, well-paid employment in a 
market gone wrong. 
Company Loyalty and the Structure of Company Employment 
Yoda (2006a: 259) defines loyalty in 1980s Japan as “how accommodating [employees] 
were to management decisions,” and certainly companies expected and continue to expect this 
accommodating attitude of their workers. Tellingly, the current practice of hiring part-time 
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workers in lieu of regular employees discourages loyalty, but companies blame workers rather 
than market conditions and their own hiring practices for a lack of loyal workers. As one of 
many groups who fill part-time positions at companies and elsewhere, sōshokudanshi are 
castigated by society for lacking sufficient loyalty, an accusation that has its beginnings long 
before the birth of many young men so arraigned. During the start-up phase of Japan’s postwar 
economic recovery, a surplus of jobs and a deficiency of qualified candidates led companies to 
implement strategies to prevent employees from moving elsewhere to better jobs. Companies 
fostered competition by dangling raises and promotions in front of workers while simultaneously 
socializing workers to tolerate ever-higher levels of pressure to perform (Yoda 2006a: 259-260). 
This system of raises, which roughly corresponded to the length of an employee’s tenure, also 
meant that the longer an employee worked, the more he had to lose by changing employers. In 
addition to this stick-disguised-as-carrot approach, companies also cultivated a benevolent, 
paternalistic façade by guaranteeing lifetime employment, which they billed as a sign of their 
commitment to employees. Corporations further leveraged this commitment by insisting on 
reciprocal obligations from its employees, most notably by loyalty to company. 
By fabricating the ideology of “company as family,” management attempted to bind 
workers on a personal level to their employers. Appropriating the concept ie—which denotes a 
patriarchal, “traditional” family system—companies re-designated the workplace as home and 
fellow workers as brothers and sisters, with management and the company playing the role of 
father.11 Companies thus socialized Japanese men to devote themselves wholeheartedly to work 
in the same way that society expected men to devote themselves to the well-being of parents and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The definition of ie has changed dramatically over time. At one point, ie referred to a household of consanguineal, 
affinal, and fictive kin (e.g., apprentices) engaged in a joint venture, such as a trade or business. The Meiji Civil 
Code later centralized power in the head of household. Moreover, the code excluded fictive kin from membership in 
the ie. After World War II, the ie system was dismantled as a legal entity (Kondo 1990: 174). 
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the economic security of wives and children. However, as anthropologist Dorinne Kondo notes, 
none of this workplace socialization occurred unproblematically (1990: 203-204). While the 
“company as family” ideology smoothed over conflict, making discord virtually unnoticeable to 
those outside the corporate circle, workers and management did clash. Workers did not simply 
accept management’s dictates, but they actively appropriated and reinterpreted what family 
meant and thus how they expected employers to treat them (Kondo 1990: 202). 
Yet “company as family” was not the only ideology deployed to produce loyal workers. 
To secure loyalty, companies also created a powerful analogy that implicitly compared (male) 
employees to Japan’s revered samurai by valorizing workers as kigyō senshi, or “corporate 
warriors.” Like samurai who dedicated themselves to a lord or cause, corporate warriors fought 
for the success of their employers on the battlefield of business. The “corporate warrior” rhetoric 
proved highly effective and pervasive, and the warrior ethos became the ideal against which 
other Japanese masculinities—including sōshokudanshi—measure themselves. Male white-collar 
workers in private industry, popularly known as sarariiman or salarymen, worked long and hard 
at their jobs, often without compensation for overtime (Dasgupta 2000: 193). Popularly credited 
with Japan’s “postwar miracle,” the salaryman became a social category and the standard of 
hegemonic masculinity, exemplifying the values of self-sacrifice, hard work, and perseverance. 
Sōshokudanshi inevitably elicit a comparison to salarymen and their hegemonic masculinity. 
Hegemonic Masculinity and the Salaryman 
While men clearly benefit from structural configurations that privilege men and 
masculinity over women and femininity, men’s structural privilege within society does not 
preclude some masculinities from benefiting at the expense of other masculinities (Connell 2005: 
76-77). Hegemonic masculinity is a term given to the most culturally sanctioned and socially 
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privileged form of masculinity. Often hegemonic masculinity acts as the standard by which 
society evaluates all other masculinities; it is the unmarked masculinity, the version from which 
all differences emanate. Yet few Japanese men perfectly fit the salaryman ideal. Moreover, the 
salaryman concept itself has never been static or stable. Rather, the salaryman is a construct that 
expands and fluctuates in response to national and world events, local practices, and social 
contexts. In the years since Japan’s recession began, the salaryman concept has increasingly 
taken on negative undertones: Excessive rigidity, competence only in the workplace, and 
impotence. The salaryman and his privileged position are fraught with internal contradictions, as 
Connell suggests about all masculinities (2005: 73). The salaryman’s control is always partial 
and never total. Nevertheless, the salaryman has retained this hegemonic position among 
Japanese masculinities because the salaryman ideal has become integrated with the economic, 
social, and political structures of Japanese society.  
 As Anne Allison highlights in her book Nightwork, the salaryman lives a precarious 
existence (1994: 189). He is emasculated by his subservience to corporate Japan, yet during the 
heyday of Japan Inc. he sought to reassert his masculinity after work in a ritualized activity. 
Before the collapse of Japan’s economic bubble, many companies paid for their workers to 
attend hostess clubs on a regular basis. At these hostess clubs, women used conversation and 
limited physical contact to make salarymen feel desirable and powerful, the type of man who can 
purchase sex from women. 
Yet this sex never actually materialized. Rather than physical acts of intercourse, what 
companies bought was the illusion that hostesses desired sex from salarymen. A form of theatre, 
the entire charade was designed to maintain worker productivity by building up the masculine 
ego. Herein lies the fragility of the salaryman: He uses women as “objects” in order to prop up 
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his unstable sense of self-worth, yet for this to work, the salaryman must mask his dependence 
on women, or face emasculation all over again (Allison 1994: 166). 
These three themes—money, power, and sex—define the salaryman, even as they 
constitute his weakness (Takeyama, personal communication, April 3, 2013). The salaryman 
earns a decent wage, but he is by no means extraordinary wealthy. His power is based on his 
privileged social position, yet this social position also renders the salaryman the servant of an 
impersonal economic system. Finally, the sexual and desirable self produced by the joint efforts 
of hostesses and salarymen would not exist without the economic transaction between hostess 
clubs and corporations, as well as the cooperation of hostesses who help maintain the illusion of 
male supremacy.  
When the economic recession hit, companies could no longer afford to pay for late nights 
at hostess clubs. As one might imagine, when this money evaporated, so too did one of the 
primary pillars supporting the salarymen sense of masculine self-worth. Entering into the 1990s 
and the new century, the salarymen remained a privileged member of Japanese society. 
Nonetheless, he is caricature of what he once, the butt of national jokes, and a faded ideal that 
many young men now reject in favor of alternative lifestyles. 
Youth, Education, and Employment 
Although historians and Japanese society credit salarymen with Japan’s successes in the 
1980s, that same society blames them for the economic failures of the 1990s. Culpability for 
Japan’s prolonged recession also falls upon young men and women, whom society perceives as 
complacent and lax in their commitment to national success. All this blame lands on Japanese 
youth despite decreasing employment opportunities and the alienating effects of the Japan’s 
educational system. Moreover, as parents and educators increasingly pressure children to 
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succeed academically, one commonly voiced fear is that young men, including sōshokudanshi, 
have given up ambition and the struggle for success altogether. 
One can trace this national obsession with children’s school performance to Japan’s 
hierarchical educational system and ultimately to hiring practices under Japan Inc. (Yoda 2006a: 
262). Japanese education teaches children to obey authority yet to be fiercely competitive when 
it comes to academics. These qualities eventually serve company interests by encouraging 
loyalty while preventing worker solidarity.  
 Placement tests determine the level of preschool, elementary school, middle school, high 
school, and college to which a child and his or her parents can aspire, and a school’s ranking 
means the difference between a prestigious position and a marginal job. In recession-era Japan, a 
school’s ranking can mean the difference between a job after college and unemployment. 
 After struggling through the rigors of “examination hell”—a period of time when young 
men and women study for Japan’s incredibly competitive college entrance exams (Yoda 2006b: 
40)—and navigating the requirements of their universities, graduates enter the job market only to 
find a conspicuous absence of opportunities for stable, well-paid positions. Unfortunately for 
recent college graduates in Japan, most government efforts to address unemployment focus 
almost exclusively on accommodating older and middle-aged workers (Genda 2003: 131-132), 
and companies reserve their few entry-level openings for graduates of top-echelon schools. Thus 
competition is fierce even after young people have graduated from universities.  
After investing energy and money in their children, Japanese parents often expect their 
sons to obtain full-time positions, and their daughters to meet and marry men with steady 
incomes. However, many young women see marriage as restricting their freedom (Tokuhiro 
2010: 131), while young men view corporate work as fundamentally unsatisfying, as simply a 
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doorway to a monotonous life of small rewards. Instead, young men and women work at part-
time jobs while pursuing or seeking out their passions.  
Japanese society refers colloquially to people who work part-time as freeters, which is a 
term that combines the English word free and the German word arbeiter, or “laborer.” Freeters 
make up a flexible pool of labor once deemed necessary to meet the shifting demands of industry 
under Japan Inc. When the recession began, this flexibility became a liability, and freeters 
became victims of the first job cuts when companies scrambled to balance their budgets. If 
corporations represent postwar Japan during the 1980-1990s, then freeters, with their lifestyles 
oriented around consumption and the rhetoric of choice, epitomize the newer national trend 
towards neoliberalism from the 1990s and onward (Lukács 2010: 170). 
Currently, public opinion implicates freeters as partially responsible for perpetuating the 
fiscal crisis. Such scholars as Masahiro Yamada also cast youth as self-centered, unwilling to 
work hard, and unable to subordinate their personal interests to the economic project of “Japan” 
(Lukács 2010: 160). Apart from practices of consumption, however, youth are largely barred 
from meaningful participation in the economy that would provide them opportunities to 
demonstrate selflessness, hard work, and commitment to a larger cause.  
Generational Conflict 
Tomiko Yoda locates generational conflict as one of the most significant social tensions 
in contemporary Japan, and indeed part time work represents a contested site where young men 
display their lackluster commitment to older models of masculinity (2006b: 42). While young 
men’s rejections of full-time work are at least partially forged in the sober reality of a weak job 
market, they are also reactions against the salaryman ideal and conservative gender ideology. 
Young men do not want to be like their fathers, and they make this abundantly clear. These 
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strategies include an emphasis on consumption-based lifestyles and the use of beautification 
technologies. 
According to Laura Miller, young men’s interest in their aesthetic and sexual appeal 
indicates that, “the ideological sphere of reference of masculinity has widened to include a 
greater diversity of physical styles” (2006: 126). This does not amount to the feminization of 
men, but a “shift to beautification as a component of masculinity” (Miller 2006: 126). For Miller, 
young men employ beauty as an appeal to female desire, a tactic for overcoming women’s 
reluctance to date, and a means of distancing themselves from their father’s masculine identities. 
The generic older man is commonly depicted as squat, balding, and frumpy in his ubiquitous, 
uniform-like business suit. Indeed, westerners often describe salarymen as the identically looking, 
identically thinking automatons that drive Japanese industry. For this reason, Miller suggests 
young men’s attention to grooming is a creative act of resistance that highlights their 
individuality by setting their bodies apart, marking them as unique.  
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Chapter Two: The Commodification of Knowledge about Herbivore Boys 
In this Chapter, I examine the writings of Maki Fukasawa, an editor, columnist, and the 
representing director of a marketing consultant group, and Masahiro Morioka, a Professor of 
philosophy and ethics at Osaka Prefecture University. Both are figures who shaped the direction 
of sōshokudanshi discourse: Fukasawa coined the term sōshokudanshi, while Morioka is 
currently the most cited authority on the subject, for reasons that I will shortly discuss. Yet here, 
the strict content of Fukasawa and Morioka’s books and articles takes a backseat to the argument 
that sōshokudanshi discourse is a site where knowledge is commodified. In examining 
how information about herbivore boys becomes a resource to be bought and sold, I further 
uncover how the production of knowledge in sōshokudanshi discourse reflects vested patriarchal 
interests. I argue that despite his position as a professor, and not as a formal salaryman or 
corporate worker, Morioka epitomizes the beliefs and values associated with salarymen under 
Japan Inc., and that salaryman ideals inform his approach to sōshokudanshi discourse.12   
To illustrate these points, I divide Chapter Two into three sections. In the first, I provide a 
detailed overview of Fukasawa and Morioka’s relationship to each other and to herbivore boys. 
In the second section, I take a closer look at how Morioka attempts to force Fukasawa out of the 
conversation, using his position as a professor in order to establish himself as the preeminent 
authority on herbivore boys. If knowledge is a commodity, then Morioka acts as a cutthroat 
capitalist by eliminating competitors who have similar access to a limited resource. Finally, I 
wrap up the chapter by rearticulating how both Fukasawa and Morioka are complicit in turning 
information about herbivore boys into something that can be bought and sold. I provide some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In the interest of revealing potential researcher bias, I will be honest: I liked Morioka as a person. He was friendly, 
engaging, and took time out of his schedule to humor an inquisitive American graduate student. He also went out of 
his way to refer me to one of his acquaintances. To some extent, my meeting with Morioka shapes my critique of 
him and his writings. However, I believe that as much as possible, researchers should avoid censoring what they 
observe in order to put a positive face on something or someone. 
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brief examples of how this practice is widespread among other interlocutors in sōshokudanshi 
discourse, who similarly treat herbivore boys as an opportunity to turn a profit. 
A Brief Synopsis of Fukasawa and Morioka 
This section provides some background information about Fukasawa, Morioka, and the 
origins of sōshokudanshi discourse. 
i. The Emergence of Sōshokudanshi Discourse 
In 2006, Maki Fukasawa coined the term sōshokudanshi in a series of articles titled “U35 
Encyclopedia of Young Men’s Marketing.” Her goal was to teach interested companies about 
various niche groups and lifestyles among young men. However, shortly after introducing the 
word sōshokudanshi, Fukasawa moved away from the topic. Her discursive absence provided 
another figure, Masahiro Morioka, with the opportunity to establish his authority on 
sōshokudanshi. Morioka began his debut into sōshokudanshi discourse with the publication of 
“Lessons in Love for Herbivorous Boys.” To teach shy sōshokudanshi how to win the heart of 
their secret crush, the book draws heavily on Morioka’s own life, as well as his alleged insights 
into “women’s psychology.”13 According to Morioka, the book also “serves as a practical 
introduction to gender studies for young people” (2013).14  
In 2009, Morioka published the sequel “Herbivorous Boys Will Bring Your Last Love,” 
supposedly in response to the popular demand from young women who wrote Morioka asking 
for advice on how to date sōshokudanshi (2013). The book contains some questionable claims, 
such as Morioka’s suggestion that Japan’s postwar peace helped produce sōshokudanshi by 
eliminating the soldier as a viable identity and leading young men to seek alternative, non-
warrior based “ways of being a man.” His evidence for this claim includes Japan’s low homicide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Morioka claims he checked with “many women” to see if his conclusions were accurate. 
14 I would hotly contest this claim, and not only because I failed to find a single gender theorist or theory mentioned 
in the book. 
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rate among young men, and the even lower rate among older men. It excludes the existence of 
the “corporate warrior” discussed in Chapter One, as well as the Japanese Self Defense Force 
and militant far-right nationalist groups. 
As director of the “Tact Planning” company, Fukasawa’s job is to teach corporations how 
to efficiently promote their products to target audiences. In this capacity, Fukasawa originally 
developed the idea of sōshokudanshi as one of several lifestyles that she outlines in her 
handbook on marketing. In other words, from the very outset, Fukasawa assembled the 
sōshokudanshi lifestyle in order to sell such commodities as alcohol and cars to young men, 
identifying certain characteristics, and then wrapping them up into a neat package for marketers. 
ii. Morioka’s Website: Lifestudies.org 
While Fukasawa initially addressed an audience consisting exclusively of marketers, 
Morioka writes to a mass audience, as is the common practice in Japanese academia, where there 
is little distinction between scholarly and popular book publications (Takeyama, personal 
communication, February 27, 2013). His skill at self-promotion and advertising himself is 
perhaps most visible on Lifestudies.org, a personal and professional website designed to spread 
Morioka’s name and presence over the Internet, as well as a major part of Morioka’s strategy for 
laying claim to authority in sōshokudanshi discourse. The website addresses two different 
audiences, and accordingly it comes in two flavors: One designed for Japanese speakers and one 
tailored to English speakers.15 Morioka posts significantly more content on the Japanese 
Lifestudies.org, including copies all of his various writings to date.  
The two version of his profile also display inconsistencies elsewhere, including a 
Japanese account of his popularity among students at Osaka Prefecture University, a brief 
English interview published in The Lancet, and a highly effective twitter feed that elicits interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A French version of Lifestudies.org appears to be up and under construction. 
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and responses from English speakers. Despite being noticeably shorter, the English website is 
not a direct translation or a mere abbreviation of the Japanese Lifestudies.org, but a separate 
narrative strategically designed to reach an audience with different assumptions, values, and 
capacities. This does not mean that the English and Japanese websites lack similar goals; rather, 
each adapts itself to a different community of speakers. 
iii. Fukasawa Returns 
In 2009, Fukasawa returned to the scene with a series of articles in the Nikkei Business 
Online, the website of a weekly business magazine that not without merit describes itself as “the 
leading source of business and technology news in Japan” (Nikkei Business Publications 2013). 
In the thirteen articles comprising “Series 1: Survival Techniques for Herbivore Boys,” 
Fukasawa takes up alternating positions as a job counselor, advocate, and matchmaker as she 
addresses sōshokudanshi and women interested in dating herbivore boys. She offers concrete, 
practical advice to young men pursuing the salaryman route: For example, she advises them to 
learn more about their companies and to develop the skills to effectively communicate their 
interests and hobbies. She also suggests that young men refrain from expressing their 
dissatisfaction with unpleasant work, because “honesty and sincerity are two different things” 
(2009a). Like many of the scholars of Japan discussed in Chapter One, Fukasawa further argues 
that the diatribes many older men launch against herbivore boys and young men in general 
spring from older men’s refusal to accept that the times have changed. Instead, despite their lack 
of efficacy and declining potency, older salarymen cling to the values and forms of masculinity 
that once flourished under Japan Inc., criticizing sōshokudanshi and young men for failing to 
demonstrate company loyalty or to live up to standards that are increasingly infeasible within 
post-bubble Japan (Fukasawa 2009a; Fukasawa 2009c). She also suggests that many young men 
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select herbivorous lifestyles in order to distance themselves from older models of masculinity, a 
conclusion that this thesis likewise reaches. 
Also in 2009, Fukasawa published her earlier U35 articles as the book “A Guide to Men 
of Heisei Era.”16 However, perhaps owing to Morioka’s attempts to push Fukasawa out of the 
conversation (discussed below), as well as the narrow audience she targets, Fukasawa’s book is 
now out of print. She has not said much on the topic since, save for a single interview in 2011. 
Fukasawa’s relative silence on sōshokudanshi may also be the result of Morioka’s attempts to 
designate himself as the premier authority on herbivore boys, or it may be that she has simply 
decided to move on. 
Morioka’s Effacement of Fukasawa 
This section examines Morioka’s attempts to establish a monopoly on sōshokudanshi 
discourse by eliminating Fukasawa as a source of potential competition. It further suggests that 
age and gender-inflected forms of power operate in Morioka’s effacement of Fukasawa. 
i. From Sōshokudanshi To Sōshokukeidanshi 
In her forward to the edited volume Words In Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon, Anna 
Tsing writes that, “words offer special insight into the remaking of worlds at different scales 
because they condense past motion in their material form” (2009: 11). Her argument resonates 
with my own analysis of how sōshokudanshi’s synonym, sōshokukeidanshi, contains the trace 
remains of a power struggle etched into language itself. The permutation of sōshokudanshi into 
sōshokukeidanshi reveals how complex age and gender-related power relations permeate 
sōshokudanshi discourse. As I will shortly argue, age and gender strongly affect both who is 
permitted to speak and who is heard, as well as whose interests take precedence in the 
conversation about herbivore boys. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Heisei Era (1989-Present) 
	  
	  
28	  
By no means a neutral or natural event, the advent of the term sōshokukeidanshi was 
guided by an agenda. Namely, the seemingly innocuous addition of the “kei” character to 
Fukasawa’s original term was both a tactic and the product of Morioka’s attempts to monopolize 
sōshokudanshi discourse. Significantly, the kanji character “kei” in sōshokukeidanshi translates 
as “relation” or “relationship,” and its addition to sōshokudanshi contributes relatively little to its 
meaning, other than softening the tone of the signifier. To be sōshokukeidanshi is to be 
herbivorous or to display herbivore-like qualities, while to be sōshokudanshi is simply to be an 
herbivore. Since sōshokudanshi is often used to castigate young men, people who invoke the 
term sōshokukeidanshi implicitly adopt a more sympathetic stance toward the signified, which is 
likely what Morioka desires, given the way he valorizes and self-identifies with herbivore boys.  
Yet contrary to what Morioka suggests elsewhere, sōshokukeidanshi was actually not his 
idea (Takeyama, personal communication, October 26, 2012). On one occasion he lets slip the 
fact that another party, his publishing editor, was actually the innovator behind the term: 
そして 2008年 4月頃に本のタイトルを決めるときに、担当編集者が『 non-no 』の特集を参考に
して「草食系男子」という言葉を提案したのである。And then in April of 2008, when I was deciding 
the title of my book, the head editor consulted “Non-no’s” report and proposed the word “sōshokukeidanshi” 
(Morioka 2011) 
 
Morioka never refers to the head editor by name, nor does he ever again mention the 
editor’s contribution. Instead, he promotes sōshokukeidanshi as his term, as well as the term par 
excellence. By substituting sōshokukeidanshi for sōshokudanshi, Morioka decouples and 
eliminates one of the most visible links between Fukasawa and herbivore boys, moving 
Fukasawa from the conversation’s center to somewhere on the periphery. Yet Morioka does not 
stop here. He further proceeds to lay claim to the public recognition that Fukasawa received 
when he writes that: 
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2009年 12月に、「新語流行語大賞」（ユーキャン主催）のトップ１０のひとつとして「草食男
子」が選ばれた。In December of 2009, “sōshokudanshi” was chosen for one of the top 10 “Popular 
Neologism Awards” (sponsored by You Can) (Morioka 2011) 
 
The sentence and its structure suggest that ten words received the honor of “neologisms 
of the year.” In truth, the word sōshokudanshi did not receive an award; Maki Fukasawa and 
Teppei Koike (no relation) jointly accepted the award in front of roughly a hundred different 
representatives from television stations, magazines, and newspapers (Jiyukokuminsha).17 Yet by 
suggesting the word sōshokudanshi attracted national attention, rather than a group of people, 
Morioka avoids recognizing or admitting the contributions of Fukasawa and Koike—a woman 
and a young man—to the genesis and proliferation of the term and phenomenon. In the process, 
Morioka frees up discursive space, which he quickly fills and exploits. When speaking of his 
book, Morioka remarks that: 
My intention was not to create a buzzword. My original aim was to encourage and reassure young boys 
who were worred [sic] about their relationships with the women they have fallen in love with. (Morioka 
2013) 
 
Here, Morioka clearly states that his influence and abilities were directly responsible for 
elevating sōshokukeidanshi to buzzword status. To the extent that sōshokukeidanshi successfully 
displaces sōshokudanshi, Morioka effaces Fukasawa’s contributions and place within 
sōshokudanshi discourse. 
In this way, the “kei” in sōshokukeidanshi represents and condenses a one-sided power 
struggle between Morioka and Fukasawa over a topic that draws public interest. Today, the terms 
sōshokudanshi and sōshokukeidanshi are largely interchangeable, often appearing within the 
same discussion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Teppei Koike is an actor who plays the role of an herbivore boy in a television drama. I suspect that Teppei Koike 
was added to the ballot because his popularity draws media attention: Koike’s appearance was greeted with the 
flashing of cameras and exclamations of “Wa—!” from surrounding women (Hashinaka 2009). How can an actor 
who plays the role of a sōshokudanshi receive an award for coining the word? A suspiciously disproportionate 
number of award recipients are actors or other photogenic celebrities.  
	  
	  
30	  
ii. Morioka’s Other Strategies 
Clearly, the transition from sōshokudanshi to sōshokukeidanshi demonstrates how power 
suffuses discourse. However, an examination of Morioka’s writings reveals many of the other 
“moves” he makes in a bid for attention and recognition. Significantly, Morioka does not want to 
share authority with Fukasawa, or anyone else for that matter. He must maintain a monopoly on 
sōshokukeidanshi, he must be the expert, a purpose that drives him to undermine Fukasawa’s 
connection to herbivore boys. 
To this end, Morioka downplays Fukasawa’s authority in his descriptions of her influence. 
Most notably, in the introductions from “Special Report No.4: on Herbivore Men” and its 
English version, “A Phenomenological Study of Sōshokukeidanshi,” Morioka writes that: 
The term "herbivore men" (soshoku-kei danshi in Japanese) was first coined by Maki Fukasawa, a 
freelance writer, in an article in a series of essays posted on the Nikkei Business Online website on October 
13, 2006. She used the phrase to describe young men who, although they have a general interest in 
heterosexual love and sex, do not show positive attitudes toward them. At that time, however, the term did 
not receive special attention. (Morioka 2010, emphasis added) 
 
深澤の提唱した「草食男子」という新語は、しかしながら 2006年の時点ではまったく人々の意
識を捉えなかった。However, at the time of 2006, Fukasawa’s proposed neologism sōshokudanshi didn’t 
really capture people’s consciousness (Morioka 2011) 
 
Two issues immediately surface. First, Morioka dismisses Fukasawa as “a freelance 
writer” instead of crediting Fukasawa with her position as a public figure and the director of a 
company. Immediately, Morioka questions Fukasawa’s authority, with a vocabulary choice that 
implies Fukasawa is a free-floating writer. By adopting this stance, he attempts to sever her close 
ties to larger institutions that legitimate her right to speak, such as the prestigious Nikkei 
Business Online, to which Fukasawa regularly contributes. Probably owing to the fact that 
Japanese readers are more likely to be familiar with Fukasawa, Morioka gives Fukasawa a little 
more credit by describing her in Japanese as a raitaa or “writer,” though still neglecting to 
mention her position as a director.  
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By rendering Fukasawa in this light, Morioka makes an implicit comparison to himself. 
Fukasawa is younger and a woman, both identities that detract from speakers’ credibility. In 
contrast, Morioka is an older man, a member of the social group that Japanese society already 
privileges in public discourse and daily life. If Fukasawa occupies an unstable position, both as a 
“freelance writer” and as someone heavily invested in the market economy, then Morioka speaks 
from the stability of a professorship in Japan’s established system of higher education 
(Takeyama, personal communication, April 3, 2013), itself closely tied to government. If 
Fukasawa engages in dubious and flexible labor, then Morioka wields authority positively 
sanctioned by Japanese institutions. Morioka can therefore erode Fukasawa’s credibility on the 
subject of sōshokudanshi, with little fear of retaliation, in a way that he would not if Fukasawa 
occupied a similar position to his own. One can easily imagine that Morioka would be more 
circumspect if Fukasawa were a professor, male, or someone his age. 
Second, Morioka explicitly states in both English and Japanese that people ignored 
Fukasawa’s term when she first coined it. This statement sets the stage for Morioka’s later 
argument that he orchestrated the emergence of sōshokudanshi as a social phenomenon, a 
process that he links with the popularization of the term. As a simple “freelance writer,” 
Fukasawa could not breathe life into the term sōshokukeidanshi: Only someone with the 
authority, knowledge, and insight could transform a word into a category, a phenomenon, and a 
group of people. Moreover, only someone like Morioka could adequately extract use-value out 
of the term, something Fukasawa is apparently unable to do despite her job in advertising.  
iii. Morioka the Salaryman 
Anne Allison’s work provides the key to understanding how Morioka’s values and beliefs 
mirror those of the hegemonic masculinity. Morioka’s power trips, his preoccupation with sex, 
	  
	  
32	  
and his salesman-like approach to selling his scholarship—all strongly mirror the power, money, 
and sex that Allison describes as preoccupations of salarymen (1994: 197). Morioka’s high 
opinion of his own scholarship leads him both to self-cite and to avoid any mention of how 
others—particularly women and feminists—have contributed to his thought, even on explicitly 
acknowledged feminist topics. The sole exception is when women and feminists prove useful for 
his ego building: For example, Morioka neglects to cite prominent Japanese feminist Chizuko 
Ueno in his essays on Japanese feminism, yet on Lifestudies.org he uses her review of one of his 
books in order to enhance its marketability. 
Morioka also typifies salarymen in the way he deems it acceptable to dismiss or ignore 
the ideas of women, even when these women are internationally renowned scholars who are far 
more published and sophisticated thinkers. For instance, Morioka wrote numerous “esseis” or 
“essays” on women’s studies, including feminism, reproductive technologies, and the modern 
family—most of which were published elsewhere, but are now also posted on Lifestudies.org 
(1999; 2000; 2002). Despite taking feminism or feminist topics as their subject, these essays 
contain negligible or no references to feminists of any sort.  
While he explicitly states his support for feminism, Morioka demonstrates his ignorance 
of feminist scholarship when he employs a double standard. He speaks authoritatively about 
women, claiming to lay bare “women’s psychology” and sexual desires (Morioka 2008: 8). Yet 
at the same time, Morioka dismisses the idea that women might have anything valid to say about 
male (hetero)sexuality. According to Morioka, men self-censor their ideas about sexuality 
around women (1999). Lacking unfiltered information, women can only draw flawed and 
incomplete conclusions about male sexuality. By openly speaking about women but forbidding 
the converse, Morioka shows his salaryman colors. Allison’s salarymen commit the same offense, 
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sexualizing hostesses and commenting on their body parts, such as their breasts, thighs, and arms. 
Yet these same salarymen reject any reciprocal move by hostesses to sexually objectify 
salarymen (1994: 73-74).  
As a knowledge producer in sōshokudanshi discourse, Morioka makes numerous 
statements saturated with rhetoric from the gender status quo, such as the claim that women are 
simultaneously attracted to and fearful of men with big bodies and muscular physiques. Or that 
women like smaller men—such as Morioka himself—because their small stature lends itself to a 
less intimidating aura. These beliefs are tied to the popular beliefs that male bodies are strong, 
invulnerable, and dangerous, while female bodies are weak, vulnerable, and harmless—both 
have been widely discredited by feminists, who point out the way such ideas reinforce male 
dominance (Hollander 2004: 299). Yet they operate in constructions of salarymen as able to 
endure high levels stress and alcohol, as well as bad diets and a lack of sleep.  
iv. Commodifying Knowledge 
 By creating information about sōshokudanshi and then converting this knowledge into 
professional capital, Morioka’s writings attempt to improve his professional standing. An 
opportunist, he takes advantage of whatever topics he believes will produce the greatest yield. 
The result is that Morioka’s scholarship addresses divergent and diverse issues, including brain 
death, the connection between pain and civilization, men with Lolita complexes, and most 
recently herbivore boys. The publicity he receives on these topics translates into greater access to 
resources, which includes students and opportunities, such as his recent invitation to present at 
the University of Michigan’s center for Japanese Studies. 
Yet how does Morioka’s hegemonic masculinity affect the way he commodifies 
knowledge? Once again, we must return to the question of who is permitted to speak, and who is 
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heard. The privilege Morioka enjoys from his salaryman-esque approach to discourse puts him at 
an advantage when making sales of information about herbivore boys to the Japanese public, just 
as the structure of capitalism in Japan favors men over women and old over young. Significantly, 
older men largely control the Japanese economy, occupying the vast majority of ranking 
positions in corporate hierarchies. While young men occupy marginal positions in the economy, 
the position of Japanese women is much worse. Statistics distilled from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications show that in 2010, 48.5 percent of women worked in the labor 
force (compared to 71.6 percent of men), and of these women only 10.6 percent are managers or 
other officials (Catalyst 2012). The economy is a male-centered domain, though not exclusively 
a male-centered concern; the effects of an economy in recession are felt throughout Japan. 
The foregoing analysis of Morioka as a de facto salaryman begs the question of whether 
other men commodify knowledge from the standpoint of hegemonic masculinity. In short, they 
do. Tomonori Morikawa, a Professor at Waseda University who teaches courses on love, 
questioned whether herbivore boys actually exist. His reasoning relies on unscientific biological 
explanations: The production of a million sperm in male bodies generates physical (heterosexual) 
desire, so herbivore boys are lying when they disavow their sexual interest in women (Yamaoka 
2011). Morikawa’s courses are apparently a favorite among female undergraduates, and like 
Morioka he appears to derive professional satisfaction from public attention and popularity 
among students. 
Other men also agree that the male body is sexual, and that it must somehow vent this 
desire. One example is Shin Watanabe, the Chairman of the Japan Cherry Boy Association 
(JCBA), a group for heterosexual virgins who are actively striving to lose their virginity. JCBA 
functions as a support group where members share tips and advertise their virgin status, hoping 
	  
	  
35	  
that women will develop an interest in “popping their cherry” (AsiaOffbeat 2007).18 Watanabe 
suggests that in the case of herbivore boys, their apathy toward sex is actually a byproduct of the 
commercial availability of pornography, which make flesh-and-blood women more trouble than 
they are worth (Ota 2011).  
While not as extensive in her practices as Morioka, Fukasawa is not innocent of 
commodifying herbivore boys for professional gain. Certainly in her more recent 2009 writings, 
Fukasawa almost seems to backpedal by explaining that she created the word sōshokudanshi 
because she was fascinated by the implications of herbivore boys for Japan’s future (Fukasawa 
2009a). She implies that curiosity, rather than profit drove her interest in singling out 
sōshokudanshi. Yet this new information does not erase the fact that Fukasawa originally 
intended the idea of sōshokudanshi to circulate among an elite and exclusive audience, one with 
access to the subscription-only content of the Nikkei Business Online. Her “Tact Planning” 
company creates and sells information to corporations; in this transaction, knowledge clearly 
becomes a commodity that is exchanged for money. Herbivore boys are but one piece of 
knowledge that Fukasawa and her company generate for profit, and had sōshokudanshi not been 
widely taken up in the media, the group may very well have remained like the other groups she 
detailed in her original articles: As profiles that facilitate the commercial exploitation of young 
men by identifying their attitudes, interests, and consumption patterns. 
A Widespread Phenomenon 
Fukasawa and Morioka are not the only “experts” who commodify herbivore boys and  
sell information to a public hungry for knowledge about sōshokudanshi. Many journalists, 
bloggers, writers, and self-described experts who speak on the topic of herbivore boys similarly 
seek their share of the returns. Based on their previous history riding the publicity given to other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 After losing their virginity, men immediately deregister from the JCBA. 
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sensationalized topics, many of these knowledge producers enter sōshokudanshi discourse 
looking to turn a profit. Kumiko Takeuchi, author of Sōshokudanshi 0.95 no Kabe: Dōbutsu 
Kōdōgakuteki Otoko Erabi (Herbivore Boy’s 0.95 Wall: Choosing Ethological Men) put out a 
book on parasite singles, and Arteisia (a pseudonym), author of Sōshokudanshi ni Koisureba (If I 
Fall in Love with an Herbivore Boy), wrote a book on the 59th Proposal.19 In fact, the publication 
of books about sōshokudanshi peaked around 2009, when sōshokudanshi received the most press. 
Solely looking at paperback publications, out of thirteen books on the subject—not counting 
multivolume comic book series—two came out in 2008, nine in 2009, and two in 2010—strong 
evidence that 2009 was the prime time to publish on sōshokudanshi. Newspapers and magazine 
articles appear to follow this same trend; the exception is online references to herbivore boys, 
which are more difficult to gauge.20 Based on the disproportionate number of documents in 2009 
that take herbivore boys as their subject, many interlocutors were evidently motivated to 
capitalize on the attention given to sōshokudanshi. This does not preclude interlocutors from 
addressing sōshokudanshi out of a genuine interest, but it does suggest that this interest was 
informed by the publicity and sales. For many others besides Morioka and Fukasawa, 
sōshokudanshi discourse is also a site where information is generated, bought, and sold. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “Parasite single” is a negative label given to unmarried men and women who live with their parents past their 
twenties. Japanese critics interpret this behavior as a sign of laziness and an unwillingness to grow up, marry, and 
become “productive” members of society. They ignore the fact that Japan’s expensive housing, coupled with a 
declining economy, makes living with one’s parents a fiscally attractive option for young men and women who 
cannot afford a place of their own. 
The “59th Proposal” is based on a real-life love story involving a career woman who writes a blog about her search 
for romance. She finds it in her 59th dating partner, hence the name. The story initially created a stir on the Japanese 
social network Mixi, and it was eventually made into a movie. 
20 I tried to do so, but could not find a program such as Google Ngram Viewer that would allow me to count the 
number of times a word was used in a given year. My sense is that most online articles on herbivore boys date to 
2009, but I have no means to measure this. At the time of this thesis, Google Ngram Viewer does not support the 
Japanese language.  
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Chapter Three: The Production of Discursive Scapegoats 
In this chapter, I argue that interlocutors create sōshokudanshi as scapegoats and straw 
men who direct attention away from larger social issues. Sōshokudanshi are only a “problem” 
because they are constructed as such by people who speak from or to positions of power, 
including those with the ability to disseminate personal interpretations and views to the rest of 
society.  
Additionally, I illustrate how sōshokudanshi discourse revolves around concerns over 
Japan’s declining economy, low birth rate, and the deterioration of heteronormative ideals and 
lifestyles. Indeed, the very formation of sōshokudanshi as an issue reflects the vested interests of 
mainly older Japanese men who wish the socialization process would seamlessly churn out 
replicas of themselves. What is at stake, then, is the very definition of masculinity in Japan, and 
perhaps even whether corporate hegemonic masculinity will continue to dominate in a nation 
that haltingly but gradually recognizes women’s rights, including the right to work and to 
maintain an existence apart from men. 
Yet even as herbivore boys serve the agendas of older men who are heavily invested in 
the gender status quo, young men and representations of sōshokudanshi have ample 
opportunities to derail heteronormativity. Often these opportunities involve performances that 
reveal the underlying arbitrary nature of gender (Butler 1990: 46). Representations of herbivore 
boys combine markers of femininity with heterosexuality, but abstain from sex, dating, and 
marriage. In doing so, they call into question Japanese heteronormative masculinity—with its 
pretensions to virility and its emphasis on stoicism, perseverance, and hard work—destabilizing 
the foundation upon which men, particularly salarymen, stake their claim to superiority in 
Japanese society.  
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Straw Men, Discursive Scapegoats 
This section argues that herbivore boys are a phenomenon created in order to address the 
insecurities of Japanese salarymen about the decline of their masculinity and changes in gender 
norms. 
In “Vicarious Language,” Miyako Inoue historicizes Japanese “women’s language,” 
examining how “teyo-dawa speech”—named for its use of teyo and dawa utterance endings—
served the interests of nationalization as a discursive scapegoat. She investigates how nineteenth 
and later twentieth century elites displaced their anxieties over the “recurrent Japanese nation-
tradition” crisis onto “women’s language” (2006: 168). Namely, in response to fears of 
westernization and the loss of “traditional” values and ways of life, Meiji-era intellectuals 
pointed to “schoolgirl speech” among young upper class women as a form of linguistic 
deterioration that signified the corruption of aristocratic values and femininity. Inoue argues that 
elites found “schoolgirl speech” unpleasant sounding because it revealed the unstable and 
conflicted existence of modern Japanese men (2006: 40-41).  
At the same time, the schoolgirls who allegedly utilized teyo-dawa speech were silenced 
even as elites permitted them to speak: According to Inoue, “the epistemic violence of linguistic 
modernity lies, therefore, not so much in its erasure of what the other is saying but in the 
exclusion of what the other is saying about what he or she said” (2006: 53). Essentially, it did not 
really matter for elites’ purposes if women actually spoke teyo-dawa speech. What mattered was 
the ability of elites to recreate and extract teyo-dawa speech from its contextual moorings, 
constructing schoolgirls and their speech as subjects though which powerful men could address 
their concerns over Japan’s modernization project. 
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The same phenomenon also appears in sōshokudanshi discourse: Whether herbivore boys 
exist or not is largely irrelevant, at least for the purposes they serve in conversations about 
politics and the economy. Moreover, young men are also silenced when they are labeled as 
herbivore boys. The discursive presence of herbivore boys is, for the most part, not of young 
men’s making; sōshokudanshi enter discourse through the words and descriptions of others who 
use herbivore boys for their own agendas. Namely, in the same way that teyo-dawa speech 
revealed the insecurities of men in a modernizing Japan, sōshokudanshi reveals salaryman fears 
over the decline of their masculinity and the gender order under Japan Inc.  
By serving as distractions, herbivore boys allow salarymen to temporary reallocate their 
culpability in Japan’s economic decline and their sense of displacement. Yet the insecurities of 
salarymen are still present, cleverly disguised by the way discourse itself is conducted: What 
sōshokudanshi have to say is (re)written when they are spoken about as if they actually speak. 
When herbivore boys appear in discourse, the performances and utterances of young men are 
extracted from any original context and recreated on the terms of interlocutors (Inoue 2006: 55). 
Yet at the same time, herbivore boys—or at least their images—seem to exist as a naturalized 
category, erasing their discursive construction. This too is a form of linguistic violence, where 
representations of herbivore boys are presented as if they speak for themselves.  
Discourse as a Reflection of Salaryman Interests 
This section elaborates on the previous section by examining who is permitted to participate 
in sōshokudanshi discourse, as well as whose interests are represented in the conversation.  
Young people are largely absent in the discussion about herbivore boys, lacking access to 
many of the resources necessary to make themselves heard. While sōshokudanshi are not as 
widespread a phenomenon as is commonly claimed, there likely exists a small number of young 
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Japanese men who claim the identity. Yet very few of them participate within sōshokudanshi 
discourse, or at least within venues that receive widespread public attention. Surprisingly few run 
their own blogs, and few if any write to newspapers, put out books, or even speak publically on 
the subject. One notable exception is the author of the blog sōshokukeidanshi no jittai or “The 
Reality of Herbivorous Boys.” The blog provides a comprehensive overview of sōshokudanshi, 
including definitions, history, and a link to a “diagnostic checker” that evaluates, percentage-
wise, whether one is an herbivore boy. 
Instead, sōshokudanshi discourse is frequently framed in terms of issues important to 
salarymen, namely the economy and population numbers. The conversation about herbivore boys 
does not attend to the interests of other groups, such as women, ethnic minorities, and people 
who pursue non-heterosexual lifestyles. Discourse does not address whether sōshokudanshi have 
any bearing on the discrimination against unmarried women over thirty, the stigma Koreans and 
Taiwanese face as foreigners living in Japan, or the lived experience of members of LGBT 
communities. Rather, sōshokudanshi discourse reflects salaryman concerns. It criticizes 
sōshokudanshi for their alleged unwillingness to become “productive” members of society, to 
marry, settle down, and reproduce; it censures young men for their lack of loyalty and singular, 
unquestioning commitment to a company.  
Sōshokudanshi discourse even judges herbivore boys for their consumption patterns. 
Sōshokudanshi are consumers, but not the kind of consumers that various entities in the Japanese 
economy want or expect. For example, herbivore boys are uninterested in the power and speed of 
sports cars, which frustrates domestic car manufacturers who rely on young men to sustain the 
Japanese car industry (Ushikubo 2008: 34). While they may patronize sweets shops, buy 
designer clothes, or use cosmetics, critics tend to ignore these consumption practices. Instead, 
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they focus on the non-heteronormative nature of these behaviors, rather than how stereotypically 
feminine activities impact the economy. 
The Failed Reproduction of Heteronormativity 
This section investigates some of the ways in which sōshokudanshi discourse remains 
marked by conservative gender ideology, but also points out how young men and representations 
of herbivore boys resist and contest salarymen masculinity through performances that 
problematize gender binaries. Ironically, even though herbivore boys enter discourse in the 
service of interlocutors with conservative agendas, their representations expand beyond their 
original uses and ultimately return to contest heteronormative ideas about masculinity and gender.  
i. A Zero Sum Game 
Sōshokudanshi discourse remains marked by conservative gender ideology, as is evident 
in the way knowledge producers treat masculinity and femininity as part of a zero sum game. To 
begin with, interlocutors uncritically accept the cultural construction of femininity as 
masculinity’s converse; what is masculine is not feminine, and vice versa. A loss of masculinity 
is therefore a gain in femininity. To the extent that herbivore boys have become less masculine 
and more feminine, Japanese women have become more masculine and less feminine. Such is 
apparent in the existence of nikushokujoshi or “carnivore girls,” the counterparts and hantai or 
“opposite” of sōshokudanshi.21 Where herbivore boys are sexually passive, carnivore girls are 
sexually active. Where herbivore boys lack the motivation to advance their careers, carnivore 
girls are driven to achieve success.  
At the same time, by problematizing the cultural linkage of certain characteristics with 
male or female bodies, sōshokudanshi and nikushokujoshi question the naturalness of gender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Nikushokujoshi are not the complete opposite of herbivore boys. For example, both carnivore girls and herbivore 
boys are typically depicted as young and urban-based. 
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categories. Men are not inherently aggressive, nor women inherently self-effacing. However, this 
swapping of traits does leave in place traditional gender binaries. Herbivore boys and carnivore 
girls stretch, but do not break away from the respective categories of “men” and “women.” As 
part of a zero-sum, they exchanged gendered traits, but never share them. Thus, herbivore boys 
and carnivore girls remain within the boundaries of gender binaries, rather than completely 
transcending them. 
ii. Heteronormative Time/Space 
Popular depictions of sōshokudanshi and nikushokujoshi reinforce the gender status quo. 
Namely, sōshokudanshi discourse is a site where interlocutors bemoan and criticize the refusal of 
young men and women to live up to the timeline set by heteronormative masculinity and 
femininity. Society expects Japanese men and women to pass through specific, non-negotiable 
life stages—such as education and marriage—each of which is associated with specific activities 
and interests. Judith Halberstam calls this “heteronormative time/space,” or naturalized 
understandings of time and space in relation to sexuality (2005: 10). Heteronormative time/space 
provides a guiding logic that organizes expectations and practices within society (Halberstam 
2005: 6). 
When people fail to perform within the bounds of heteronormative time/space, they risk 
social sanctions, though the severity of these sanctions varies based on a number of factors. For 
example, unmarried Japanese women over thirty are deeply stigmatized in a way that unmarried 
Japanese men are not. Junko Sakai illustrates this in Makeinu no Toboe, a book that discusses 
makeinu or “loser dogs”: Childless, unmarried women who have supposedly “lost out” on 
heterosexual marriage and are no longer desirable due to their age.22  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A Japanese saying compares women to Christmas cakes, best “eaten” on the 25th and not after. 
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To some extent, sōshokudanshi’s existence outside heteronormative time/space challenges 
the gender status quo, as does their refusal to conform to the strictly delineated life stages that 
Japanese society sets out for them. Journalists, bloggers, writers, and self-described experts 
debate whether young men’s repudiation of heteronormative time/space will impact Japan’s 
population, with most arguing that young men and herbivore boys are directly responsible for 
Japan’s low birth rate (Nikkei Biz Academy 2009; Nikkei BP 2012). According to this logic, 
their disinterest in marriage and sex means that herbivore boys will not have children, which 
poses a population problem for a rapidly aging society (Statistics Bureau 2012: 14-15).  
By focusing on sōshokudanshi, interlocutors ignore or shove aside the concrete factors—
such as Japan’s recession and gender inequalities—that make the freedoms of a single, childless 
lifestyle attractive for many young people, not just sōshokudanshi (Fogarty 2007). Youth are 
realistic about economically and socially viable lifestyles, and this may lead them to spurn the 
cultural mandate that they marry and have children (Honda 2006: 156). Yet too often public 
discourse paints youth as simply rebellious when they decline to follow heteronormative 
time/space, instead of portraying them as informed actors who select lifestyles based on 
preference, albeit tempered by socioeconomic and cultural conditions. The subversive potential 
of a performance is especially great when, rather than blundering into non-heteronormative 
lifestyles, young men and women survey the dominant gender constructs, find them wanting, and 
opt for creative new ways of enacting gender. 
iii. Performativity and Gender Equality 
As Judith Butler argues, performances are “acts, gesture, and desire [that] produce the 
effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body” (1990: 185, 
emphasis author's). Performances reveal the makeshift nature of identity, the self, and other 
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social constructs such as heterosexuality. For Butler, performance is at its most potent in drag, a 
parody that denaturalizes gender and hegemonic heterosexuality.  
Discourse often depicts sōshokudanshi as engaging in drag and drag-ish like activities, 
such as wearing bras and skirts, or using parasols to protect their skin from the sun in order to 
achieve a pale complexion (Asahi Shimbun 2009; Fukasawa 2009b). More often, herbivore boys 
are depicted as thin, bespectacled, fashion-conscious young men (SōshokukeidanshiKenkyūkai 
2009). Instead of robust physique or a disheveled appearance, sōshokudanshi appear well 
groomed and even androgynous.  
As a performance, androgyny has the potential to problematize cultural preconceptions 
about gender. In her book Takarazuka, Jennifer Robertson defines androgyny as the mixing of 
gendered markers in a way that problematizes, but does not entirely overturn gender binaries. As 
aspects of gender binaries are swapped and combined, many retain their older signification as 
masculine or feminine (1998: 47-48). By pairing an androgynous appearance with 
heterosexuality and “feminine” activities, representations of herbivore boys reveal the arbitrary 
way in which certain performances are linked with certain bodies. 
Sōshokudanshi may be a label imposed on young men in order to enforce 
heteronormativity, and the interlocutors who discursively construct herbivore boys may occupy 
privileged positions that could be damaged by changes in the gender status quo. Yet even as 
interlocutors attempt to label, define, and thereby manage and control young men through 
sōshokudanshi discourse, there is always some slippage: When people express ideas their ideas 
within discourse, they have no guarantee where or how these ideas will end up (Eckert and 
McConnell-Ginet 2003: 92). Utterances, statements, and arguments can be taken up and used by 
others in ways that differ from the intentions of their original speakers. This is evident even in 
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the very beginnings of sōshokudanshi discourse, when Fukasawa’s marketing category became a 
social concern that earned national attention.  
Herbivore boys and other interlocutors also appropriate criticisms, turning them into 
something positive. Take, for example, the discussion depicting herbivore boys as incapable of 
striving for or achieving full-time employment. According to the dominant line of thought, 
herbivore boys must settle for part-time work, often regarded as employment for males who fail 
at being adult men. Yet according to one of the few self-identified, albeit atypical herbivore boy, 
sōshokudanshi value part time labor because full-time work involves high levels of stress and 
competition (www.so-shoku.net 2013). Yes, this herbivore boys says, we are not full-time 
workers, but only because we choose not to be. He offers the personal example of when he 
turned down an offer to transition to full-time status, simply because it did not suit his purposes 
and the lifestyle he wants to lead. This herbivore boy earned full-time employment, was offered 
it, and refused. Full-time work was not an issue of capability or willingness to work hard, but—
according to this man’s rhetoric—of choice, a priority of Japan’s younger generations that value 
flexible lifestyles. 
Thus, as much as older Japanese men attempt to contain the non-heteronormative 
performances of younger men through discourse, their words are not set in stone. There is always 
room for maneuver, and some excess always escapes. This excess may effect real changes. For 
example, salarymen may see young men eating in sweet shops and cry “sōshokudanshi!” Yet in 
publicizing that young men engage in this stereotypically feminine activity, interlocutors 
contribute to the awareness that such occurrences are increasingly common, which in turn 
lessens its stigma ever so slightly. 
	  
	  
46	  
Excess is by definition difficult to capture, making it difficult for researchers to trace how 
small amounts, applied over a period of time, create changes in larger social arenas and 
constructs. Many of the shifts it instigates are also gradual, further increasing the problems of 
definitively linking excess to change. However, not all excess is difficult to pinpoint. The 
sensationalization of bras as part of the herbivore’s wardrobe created a demand for men’s bras, to 
the point where an actual market emerged, along with brand name bras such as WishRoom and 
Men’sWISH. While the widespread adoption of women’s lingerie by Japanese men is unlikely, 
wearing a men’s bra is a performative statement—whether someone sees the bra or not—that 
plays with and parodies gender binaries. Through every such performative act, the closed 
definitions of masculinity and femininity open up a little further. As these small subversive 
moments accumulate, the definition of masculinity stretches, growing increasingly dissimilar—
though never ahistorically separate—from the masculinities that came before.  
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Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
In conclusion, herbivore boys represent the latest alternative masculinity among a 
younger generation that increasingly values flexible lifestyles and creative choice. Yet unlike 
such other alternative masculinities as SMAP and hosts, sōshokudanshi exist almost entirely in 
the realm of discourse, though their behaviors are grounded in actual behaviors and trends 
displayed by young Japanese men. 
In this thesis, I have argued that sōshokudanshi became a discourse because journalists, 
writers, bloggers, and self described “experts”—including Maki Fukasawa and Masahiro 
Morioka—promoted and sensationalized the topic in order to capitalize on the public interest and 
concern surrounding trends in young men’s behavior. While some saw herbivore boys as a 
chance to further their careers, others attempted to make money by capitalizing on media 
attention, though the two motives are not mutually exclusive. 
Additionally, I have suggested that sōshokudanshi serve as discursive scapegoats that 
older men in Japan blame for a number of real and perceived social ills. These include the fall of 
hegemonic masculinity, Japan’s economic stagnation, and the declining birthrate. In contrast to 
the conservative and heteronormative ideology of the nation’s older (male) generation, discourse 
connects herbivore boys to creative lifestyles and the rhetoric of choice. 
Ultimately, herbivore boys demonstrate the way in which knowledge is produced to serve 
the vested interests of mainly older men who continue to occupy privileged positions in Japan’s 
economy. At the same time, sōshokudanshi demonstrate how the meaning of a discourse can slip 
beyond the control of its creators and participants. While herbivore boys may not exist as a 
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population, as representations within discourse they ever so slightly change what it means to be a 
Japanese man. 
Improvements and Future Directions 
This project could benefit from many improvements, including an increase in my Japanese 
language proficiency. As of this thesis, I have taken roughly three years of college-level Japanese, 
including two trips to Japan for the purpose of learning the language. My speaking, reading, and 
writing skills remain limited, and they shaped the avenues I could feasibly pursue during my two 
years as a Master’s student. Ideally, if I were to return to this project, I would do so with a better 
grasp of the Japanese language, allowing for increased sophistication in my search for sources, 
greater depth in my analysis of current sources, and a higher quantity and quality of 
communication with potential informants. 
Additionally, I would make a greater effort to incorporate women’s voices, such as by 
contacting and arranging interviews with the many women who post comments about dating 
sōshokudanshi. Maki Fukasawa is by no means the only woman to participate in sōshokudanshi 
discourse, and aside from older Japanese men, young women appear to be some of the most 
interested and enthusiastic commenters on the subject, though they have yet to definitively break 
into the insulated conversation about herbivore boys. I would also devote more time to 
discussing the role of the state and its relationship to Japan’s market economy. Specifically, I 
would explain in greater detail exactly how the male-centered configuration of both structurally 
privileges older heterosexual men over women, LGBTs, and youth. 
I could make other improvements to this project by spreading my net wider, trying harder to 
capture the discrete and isolated number of self-identified herbivore boys who make their 
presence known, usually online. While I attempted to contact each of these self-identified 
	  
	  
49	  
sōshokudanshi, I did not receive any replies, and failed to pursue the matter further. If I were to 
redo this project with better Japanese language skills, I would use my profile on the Japanese 
social network Mixi to elicit interest and participation for my research. 
In my future research, I hope to this study herbivore boys and incorporate its findings into 
a larger investigation into Japanese masculinity. While I do not plan on continuing with an 
exclusive focus on sōshokudanshi, I am currently considering a project that examines displays of 
male heterosexuality within the context of dating. If I proceed with this inquiry, herbivore boys 
could provide a foil against which I might juxtapose conventional understandings of Japanese 
male heterosexuality.23  
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